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Back to the Congressional Drawing Board: 
Inapplicability of the AUMF to Al-Shabaab 
and Other New Faces of Terrorism 
BY PIERCE RAND* 
“Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to 
Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to recognize that 
the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a 
decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard ques-
tions—about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.”
1
 
- President Barack Obama 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in order to safeguard our nation 
from future terrorist threats.
2
 The language of the AUMF denotes a nar-
row scope—sanctioning military action exclusively against Al-Qaeda 
and other responsible entities. To best serve the needs of America’s 
“War on Terror,” however, this narrow scope has now expanded to in-
clude alternative global Islamist terrorist organizations.
3
 
Over the last twelve years, America’s efforts during this “War on 
Terror” have achieved mixed results. Most authorities would agree that 
the death of Osama Bin Laden, coupled with the frequent drone and 
military strikes against prominent Al-Qaeda officials, have drastically 
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  I would like to thank Professor David Glazier for all of 
his help navigating the complexities of this topic. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors 
and staff of the ILR for all of their hard work on this article. 
 1. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National Defense Univer-
sity (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university [hereinafter Obama’s Remarks]. 
 2. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 3. Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, LAWFARE, 5-6, 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/After-the-AUMF-Final.pdf (last visit-
ed March 27, 2015); see also Philip H. Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight 
the Right War, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 6, 2007), at 1-3, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won. 
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diminished Al-Qaeda’s prominence and operational capacity.
4
 The 
same, however, cannot be said of other more recently established Islam-
ist terrorist organizations, which have not only persisted in the face of 
American military might, but also stiffened their resolve and deepened 
their militant roots.
5
 Al-Shabaab in Somalia represents a prime example 
of this phenomenon; the increased American military attention has 
failed to deter the organization’s continuous rise in prominence predi-
cated on acts of violence and terror.
6
 This has allowed Al-Shabaab, 
along with other organizations, to readily fill the vacancy left in the 
wake of Al-Qaeda’s inescapable decline, and these emboldened Islamist 
groups have developed into significant international terrorist threats.
7
 As 
President Obama aptly put it, the landscape of international terrorism 
has indeed “shifted and evolved.”
8
 
Armed with over a decade of experience from combating amor-
phous terrorist cells and a rapidly growing fleet of technologically ad-
vanced drones capable of delivering lethal payloads to the far corners of 
the globe, America is militarily and tactically prepared to combat these 
evolving adversaries.
9
 Indeed, military action against many of these 
groups have already begun, as evidenced by the drone and military 
strikes launched against Al-Shabaab over the past several years.
10
 While 
strategically effective, these strikes are not without controversy; in fact, 
a growing question among the legal community espousing concern has 
emerged: are these drone and military strikes legal?
11
 
The following discussion will explore this question by applying 
 
 4. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
TERRORISM 2011 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Obama’s Remarks, supra note 1. 
 9. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones 
to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 255 (2012), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwilr/PDFs/44-
2/2-%20McDonnell.pdf. 
 10. Chris Woods, Militants and Civilians Killed in Multiple US Somalia Strikes, THE 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/militants-and-civilians-killed-in-up-to-20-us-
somalia-strikes-new-study-shows/. 
 11. Robert Chesney, Back to Lethal Force in Somalia: What If Anything Does the Drone 
Strike on Ibrahim Ali Signify?, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2013, 5:38 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/back-to-lethal-force-in-somalia-what-if-anything-does-the-
drone-strike-on-ibrahim-ali-signify/. 
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domestic legal authority—specifically the 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military force (AUMF) and its dubious “Associated Forces” expan-
sion—to Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization that has recently made 
headlines with its violent attack on a Nairobi mall resulting in over six-
ty-seven deaths.
12
 It is true that one could potentially derive alternative 
domestic authority from the Presidential powers enumerated in Article 
II of the United States Constitution.
13
 However, the scope of these pow-
ers is particularly convoluted, and application of Article II would pre-
sent complicated questions of Constitutional law that warrant independ-
ent consideration.  Consequently, this discussion will presume that the 
2001 AUMF operates as a congressional declaration of war and thus 
provides the preeminent authority used to justify American use of force 
against Al-Shabaab. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent analysis, 
the AUMF is a relic from the previous decade applicable to an interna-
tional armed conflict in its final stages. Such an aged authority not only 
offers an attenuated legal basis for American military action against Al-
Shabaab and other new faces of terrorism, but has also created the im-
pression in the international community that our war on terror is bound-
less, extrajudicial, and impenetrably veiled in secrecy. 
This discussion will be developed in the following format: Section 
II will explore the history of Somali Islamism and the development of 
Al-Shabaab. This historical perspective will provide context and estab-
lish the foundation for later legal analysis when searching for a substan-
tive connection between Somali Islamist organizations and Al-Qaeda. 
Section III will briefly discuss the recent acts of Al-Shabaab terrorism 
and America’s military response to these acts. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to unambiguously demonstrate Al-Shabaab’s prominence among 
international terrorist organizations as well as delineate the scope of 
American use of force against Al-Shabaab. Section IV will evaluate the 
legality of America’s military strikes against Al-Shabaab by determin-
ing whether the terrorist organization falls within the parameters of the 
2001 AUMF as outlined by Congress. In addition, this section will ex-
plore the development of the Associated Forces label and evaluate the 
legal permissibility of this broad extension to AUMF authorization. 
Section V will conclude that the AUMF’s limited scope cannot be con-
strued to cover Al-Shabaab and other modern terrorist organizations and 
 
 12. Daniel Howden, Terror in Nairobi: the Full Story Behind al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:09 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 
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thus, further congressional action is required to ensure the legality of 
military strikes against these new faces of terror 
II. SOMALI ISLAMISM AND THE HISTORY OF AL-SHABAAB 
Somalia is a small, impoverished, mostly ungoverned nation bor-
dered by Ethiopia and Kenya in Southeastern Africa.
14
 Nearly all Soma-
lis identify as Sufi Muslims.
15
 Sufism is a non-extremist branch of Islam 
focused on prayer and worship, and is less concerned with adherence to 
the Sharia.
16
 A comparatively small minority of Somalis, however, ad-
here to Salafism, an Islamist
17
 and militant branch of the Muslim faith 
divergent from Sufism. Salafism is primarily focused on strict adher-
ence to the Sharia and is also often associated with terrorist organiza-
tions.
18
 
The stark ideological differences apparent in the belief system of 
the Sufi majority and Salafi minority have created significant friction 
relevant to understanding the development of Islamism in Somalia to-
day.
19
 This section will explore the impact of this ideological friction on 
the development of militant Islamism in Somalia from its largely innoc-
uous and unfocused origins during the 1991 Somali civil war into Al-
Shabaab, one of the most active and notorious contemporary terrorist 
organizations.
20
 Additionally, this section will evaluate the scope and 
effectiveness of Al-Qaeda’s efforts to propagate Salafist militant ideol-
ogy in Somalia, which ran parallel to, but sometimes intersected with, 
the historical development of Somali Islamism from the early 1990’s 
through the present.
21
 
 
 14. Markus Virgil Hoehne, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Counter-
terrorism in Somalia: How external influences helped to produce militant Islamism, CRISIS IN 
THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1 (Dec. 17, 2009), http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf. 
 15. Id.; see George-Sebastian Holzer, Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Rad-
ical Islamic Groups?, 1 GEOPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE E. 23 (June 2008), available at 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5337~v~Political_Islam_in_Somalia__A_F
ertile_Ground_for_Radical_Islamic_Groups.pdf. 
 16. THE CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, TEAM ‘B’ II, SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA, 2-3 (2010), 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/article%20pdfs/Shariah%20-
%20The%20Threat%20to%20America%20%28Team%20B%20Report%29%20Web%20Version
%2009302010.pdf. 
 17. For a definition of Islamism, see Hoehne, supra note 144, at 2. 
 18. Somalia’s Islamists, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/100-somalias-islamists.aspx. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. See generally Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 
23, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. 
 21. See generally Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, & Vahid Brown, Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis) Adven-
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It is wise to approach this subject with a tabula rasa and disregard 
any preconceived notion that the radically charged Islamist atmosphere 
existing in Somalia today is indicative of the country’s cultural norm.
22
 
If one allows their views to be clouded by contemporary events, it is 
easy to misestimate the varying historical motives and tenacity of So-
mali Islamist groups. Those who make this error often espouse the one-
dimensional theory that the existence of Islamist organizations and mere 
presence of Al-Qaeda operations in the Horn of Africa during the 
1990’s is sufficient to prove that Somalia served as a “fertile ground for 
Al-Qaeda terrorism” in modern history.
23
 Those maintaining this belief 
typically argue that this “fertile ground” was not only integral to the de-
velopment of Somali Islamist organizations, but also supports the notion 
that a meaningful nexus exists between Al-Shabaab and pre-9/11 Al-
Qaeda.
24
  Although available support for this theory is far from disposi-
tive, the existence of such a connection could profoundly impact the ap-
plicability of the AUMF to Al-Shabaab. As a result, understanding the 
true nature of Somalia’s Islamist roots, particularly before 9/11, is nec-
essary to perform a proper legal analysis of American contemporary use 
of force against Al-Shabaab. 
Part A will evaluate the birth and initial development of the Al Iti-
had Al Islam (AIAI) and Somali Islamism pre-9/11. Part B will discuss 
the successes and failures of Al-Qaeda’s operations in Somalia during 
this same period. Part C will outline the post-9/11 development of the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the beginning of Islamist extremism. 
Finally, Part D will explore the emergence of Al-Shabaab as a promi-
nent terrorist group and consider the organization’s future intentions. 
Dividing the history of Somali Islamism in this way will draw contrast 
between the prevailing ideology and methodology during the pre- and 
post- 9/11 periods. This in turn will lead to a better understanding of 
how Al-Shabaab came into existence and provide clarity about the 
AUMF’s applicability to this organization. 
 
tures in the Horn of Africa, HARMONY PROJECT, WESTPOINT (July 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-misadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa. 
 22. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1.4 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also James Phillips, Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terror-
ism, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/04/somalia-and-al-qaeda-implications-for-the-war-
on-terrorism. This assumption will be important for application to the AUMF infra Part IV. 
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1. The AIAI and Pre-9/11 Islamism 
Prior to 1990, Islamism held minimal significance in Somali poli-
tics and culture.
25
 As mentioned, the vast majority of Somalis have his-
torically identified themselves as Sufi Muslims, a group that holds con-
trasting views to the fundamentalist ideology promoted by Salafism.
26
 
Additionally, Islamism was suppressed under the Somali Democratic 
Republic headed by Mohamed Siyad Barre for much of the 20th centu-
ry.
27
 It was not until the civil war in 1991, which brought about the col-
lapse of this government, that Islamism took root and began to emerge 
(albeit largely ineffectively) as an ideology in Somalia.
28
 
The primary Islamist organization that materialized from this civil 
war was known as the AIAI.
29
 Religiously, the AIAI identified itself as 
Salafist and promoted strict adherence to the Sharia.
30
 The religious and 
ideological beliefs within the AIAI, however, were not uniform and 
scholars have characterized the AIAI as an “umbrella organization” that 
loosely unified the different Islamist sects in Somalia.
31
 Although large-
ly diluted by clan politics and ideological differences, the fundamental 
purpose of the AIAI was to establish an Islamist state in Somalia gov-
erned by strict adherence to Sharia law and to also reclaim Ogaden, a 
contested territorial region bordering southwestern Somalia and Ethio-
pia.
32
 
The AIAI gained initial success in establishing territorial presence; 
they had convinced a number of Somalis in regions under their control 
to embrace the Sharia.
33
 This success, however, was short lived and the 
AIAI struggled to retain and expand power for four reasons. First, the 
absence of a unified religious ideology weakened the AIAI’s founda-
tion; this ultimately led to an internal schism in the mid-1990’s.
34
 Sec-
ondly, the AIAI as an organization was not impervious to the clan poli-
tics ubiquitous in Somali society;
35
 these clan ties, and the inevitable 
 
 25. See id. at 1-2. 
 26. Holzer, supra note 15, at 26. 
 27. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 2-3. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Holzer, supra note 15, at 26-27. 
 30. Id. . 
 31. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3. 
 32. See Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, STAN. U., 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/99 (last visited Dec. 15, 
2015). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
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conflicts they created, strongly degraded the cohesiveness within the 
AIAI.
36
 Thirdly, the AIAI failed to gain the necessary public support;
37
 
this was partly because the organization failed to convey an impression 
of strength or unity, but mostly because the AIAI adhered to a disfa-
vored Islamist ideology.
38
 And lastly, the Sufi majority rejected the 
AIAI’s interpretation of Sharia law because “its punishments . . . were 
perceived as cruel and un-Somali.”
39
 While not an exhaustive list, these 
detrimental factors created fissures within the AIAI that strongly un-
dermined the organization’s foundation. 
The AIAI tried to gain military and ideological strength in Somalia 
throughout the 1990’s, but their efforts yielded little success.
40
 After 
several crushing military defeats, what little unity the AIAI enjoyed be-
gan crumbling as faction leaders acted unilaterally and turned their ag-
gression toward reclaiming lost territory in Ethiopia.
41
 These fragmented 
AIAI militant groups established bases in the Lu’uq and Ogaden regions 
of southwestern Somalia, where they launched attacks against the Ethi-
opian government and its civilian targets.
42
 These attacks elicited an 
overwhelming military backlash from the Ethiopian government and in 
1996, the AIAI Islamists in Lu’uq and Ogaden were forced to abandon 
their positions.
43
 Since the organization’s internal conflicts had already 
placed the AIAI in a weakened state, the Ethiopian retaliation proved to 
be a crippling blow.
44
 
By 1996, nearly all unity within the AIAI dissolved and the organ-
ization faded from Somalia’s volatile political landscape.
45
 The failure 
of the AIAI, however, did not prove fatal to Islamism in Somalia as a 
whole. The legacy of the AIAI endured and ex-members—many of 
whom were wealthy and influential—reemerged in prominent positions 
within their communities.
46
 These ex-AIAI members created moderate 
 
 36. Id.; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 27-28. 
 
 37. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3. 
 38. Id. at 2-6; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab, STAN. U., available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61, (last visited Dec. 15, 
2015). 
 39. Holzer, supra note 15, at 28. 
 40. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3-4. 
 41. Watts et. al., supra note 20, at 35-36.   
 42. Id.; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28. 
 43. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Hoehne, supra note 14 at 4; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28. 
 46. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36. 
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Sharia courts throughout Somalia that operated both as judicial and po-
litical institutions.
47
 As will be explained later, these new courts became 
popular among Somalis who viewed them both as a semblance of order 
in an otherwise order-less state and also as a means of retaliation against 
external influence.
48
 This favorable shift in perception regarding the 
Sharia courts was initially subtle, yet substantively important since 
these courts would later serve as the foundation for Islamist resurgence 
under the ICU.
49
 
2. Beginning of Al-Qaeda Operations 
Before continuing with the evolution of militant Islamism in So-
malia, it is important to note how Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Horn of 
Africa influenced the development of the AIAI in the 1990’s.
50
 Accord-
ing to Al-Qaeda documents (Harmony Documents) recently declassified 
by the American government, it is well established that Al-Qaeda be-
lieved that the poverty and destabilization in the Horn of Africa would 
encourage the establishment of an Islamist state from which Al-Qaeda 
could expand their base of operation beyond the Arabian Peninsula.
51
 
Al-Qaeda specifically targeted Somalia after the fall of the Siad 
Barre regime in 1991, which left Somalia destabilized.
52
 The Harmony 
Documents indicate that shortly after the onset of the 1991 civil war, 
Al-Qaeda began operations in Somalia by sending agents to recruit 
members, establish military camps, and propagate Jihadist ideology.
53
 
Despite these efforts, Al-Qaeda operatives found themselves unwel-
come in Somalia and faced repeated unexpected hurdles that they were 
ultimately unable to overcome. 
The first hindrance to Al-Qaeda’s operations stemmed from the 
Somalis’ unwavering clan loyalty and different ideological values.
54
 
While these two factors may seem distinct they are actually intercon-
 
 47. Holzer, supra note 15, at 29-30; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36. 
 48. Watts et al., supra note 21 at 36; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
 49. Watts et al. supra note 21, at 36; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 29-30. 
 50. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 34-35. 
 51. Id. at 21. 
 52. Id. at 77-78.  
 53. Id. at 37-39; see also Sayf al-Islam, The Ogaden File: Operation Holding (Al-MSK), 
Harmony Program AFGP-2002-600104, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT (Jan. 
26, 1993), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/The-Ogaden-File-
Operation-Holding-Al-Msk_-Original.pdf (describing a document being sent by Al-Qaeda to the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia to construct training camps.). 
 54. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 37-39.  
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nected.
55
 Nearly all Somali’s, including Salafists and Islamists are, first 
and foremost, loyal to their clan.
56
 In its attempt to recruit Islamists from 
the AIAI, Al-Qaeda was ill-prepared to deal with the complexities un-
derscoring this clan-oriented mentality.
57
 Unlike the AIAI that temporar-
ily managed to coexist with clan friction because of their homogeneity, 
Al-Qaeda was perceived as foreign and intrusive.
58
 As a result, Somali 
individuals who joined Al-Qaeda risked severe punishment or clan iso-
lation because they were often perceived as having abandoned their 
clan.
59
 Overcoming this clan identity proved to be such an obstacle to 
Al-Qaeda’s efforts that operatives considered the elimination of clan 
leaders to be second in priority to expelling western forces.
60
 As Al-
Qaeda quickly learned, the pecuniary and ideological benefits of joining 
their organization did not outweigh the risk of “tribal exclusion” for 
most Somalis and ultimately, the predominance of Somali tribal loyal-
ties strongly contributed to the failure of Al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts 
during this period.
61
 
The logistical and financial challenges that arose from functioning 
in the “security vacuum” of Somalia comprised the second significant 
hindrance to Al-Qaeda’s operations.
62
 This difficulty was demonstrated 
in a letter from Abu Hafas, a prominent Al-Qaeda operative in Somalia, 
where he stated, “we found out that it is difficult to do this in the areas 
that we visited because of dangers pertaining to security. This is why it 
is preferred that the courses be done by you in Khartoum. As a result 
 
 55. Id. at 29 (defines Clannism as “Somalia is a lineage-based society, where virtually all 
members of society are identified in part by their clan family. Somali clannism is fluid, complex, 
and frequently misunderstood. At the risk of oversimplification, one can make the case that 
clannism– especially since the collapse of the state in 1991–forms the basis for most of the core 
social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society, including personal identity, rights of 
access to local resources, customary law (xeer), blood payment (diya) groups, and social support 
systems.”)  
 56. Id.  
 57. Abu Belal, Abu Belal’s Report on Jihad in Somalia, Harmony Program AFGP-2002-
800640, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/abu-
belals-report-on-jihad-in-somalia-english-translation-2 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); see also 
Watts et. al., supra note 20, at 22. 
 58. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 22. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 6; Report on the Needs of the Mujahidin in Somalia, Harmony Program AFGP-
2002-800600, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT (Feb. 19, 1993), 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Report-on-the-Needs-of-the-Mujahidin-in-
Somalia-Partial-Translation.pdf. 
 61. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 22. 
 62. Id. at 14. 
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this will save us transportation expenses and others.”
63
 This statement 
demonstrates that maintaining security was unexpectedly expensive and 
proved to be an impediment to Al-Qaeda’s operations. Furthermore, 
poverty and poor infrastructure made obtaining and transporting sup-
plies, weapons, and basic equipment in Somalia excessively difficult 
and expensive.
64
 As a result, Al-Qaeda training camps were consistently 
undersupplied and isolated.
65
 A letter from an unknown Al-Qaeda agent 
pleading for assistance best expressed this frustration; according to him, 
the training camps “start from nothing, and [is] in need of everything—
food, car, ammunitions and weapons.”
66
 Further exacerbating the situa-
tion, much of the supplies requested by Al-Qaeda operatives never ar-
rived,
67
 and the supplies that did survive would often disappear into the 
coffers of warlords by means of theft and extortion.
68
 Al-Qaeda opera-
tives did not expect operational expenses in Somalia to be high, they al-
so did not account for the Somali warlords and clan leaders’ uncoopera-
tive nature.
69
 These factors negatively impacted Al-Qaeda operations 
and appeared to have contributed to Al-Qaeda’s ultimate failure in So-
malia during this period. 
The consistent theme underlying these two factors is that the de-
stabilized atmosphere in Somalia, which Al-Qaeda believed to be ad-
vantageous to its operational capacity, actually proved to be an unantic-
ipated obstacle. Navigating the complexities of Somalia’s clan-oriented 
culture while financially covering the exorbitant cost of bribes and sup-
plies, generated a far greater burden than Al-Qaeda had expected.
70
 
These obstacles simply could not be overcome during the 1990’s, and 
Somalia neither provided the “fertile grounds for Al-Qaeda terrorism” 
nor the jihadist ideology they promoted.
71
 As a result, it is logical to 
conclude that Somali Islamists were not closely aligned with Al-Qaeda 
 
 63. Id. at 15; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, supra note 
32.  
 64. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 15, 19-20. 
 65. Id. at 19-20. 
 66. Letters on Al-Qaeda’s Operations in Africa, Harmony Program AFGP-2002-800621, 
COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Letters-on-al-Qaida%E2%80%99s-Operations-in-Africa-
Translation1.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 67. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 19. 
 68. Id. at 19-20. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 19-20. 
 71. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1. 
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during the 1990’s.
72
 
3. Post 9/11 Islamism, the ICU, and the Transition into Terrorism 
Despite the AIAI’s decline forcing Somali Islamists into a “re-
building period” and Al-Qaeda operations in the region having funda-
mentally failed, America incorrectly presumed the existence of a strong 
working relationship between Al-Qaeda and the AIAI.
73
 For example, 
when Al-Qaeda claimed to have assisted in the battle of Mogadishu in 
1993 and the U.S. Embassy attacks in Dar el Salaam and Nairobi in 
1998, America assumed that Somali Islamists must have also contribut-
ed.
74
 There is, however, an utter lack of evidence demonstrating Somali 
Islamist participation in the battle of Mogadishu, and “no one really 
knows” if the AIAI was linked to the embassy bombings.
75
 Casting fur-
ther doubt on this presumed relationship is the fact that the AIAI had 
been “defunct” since the above-mentioned 1996 Ethiopian incursion re-
sulting from the AIAI’s violence in Ogaden.
76
 At that time, the AIAI 
simply lacked the motivation and capacity to materially participate in 
these attacks.
77
 In summation, there is insufficient evidence to link the 
AIAI and Somali Islamists to Al-Qaeda terrorism and 9/11. 
However, in the midst of the charged atmosphere surrounding the 
aftermath of 9/11, America continued to overestimate Al-Qaeda’s rela-
tionship with the AIAI and Somali Islamists.
78
 For instance, America 
mistakenly suspected that the Somali bank, Al-Barakaat, participated in 
the financing of the 9/11 attacks.
79
 As a result, Somalia became a focal 
point of American scrutiny, which prompted America to launch a joint 
effort with Ethiopia to disrupt suspected terrorist activity.
80
 In this joint 
operation, America hired Somali warlords to target prominent Islamists 
and persons believed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
81
 On this note, re-
call that Islamism was not historically popular among the predominantly 
 
 72. Id..  
 73. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 38. 
 74. Holzer, supra note 15, at 28. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 28-29. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 37. 
 79. John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, & Serena Wille, Staff Report to Commission, Mono-
graph on Terrorist Financing, NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. 10, 
82-84, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2014). 
 80. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 8. 
 81. Id. 
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Sufi majority in Somalia. Nevertheless, America’s “dirty war” generat-
ed a great deal of Anti-American sentiment, which in turn engendered 
support for the Sharia courts and Islamist ideology generally.
82
 This 
public support bolstered the courts’ influence, and in 2006, eleven 
prominent Sharia courts united and organized into the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU).
83
 It is difficult to determine with exact precision when the 
remnants of the AIAI merged with the ICU, but it is clear that after 9/
11, the Sharia courts, and later, the ICU, operated as the primary Islam-
ist institution in Somalia.
84
 Like the AIAI, the ICU served as an umbrel-
la organization for a diversity of Islamist views; and while the bulk of 
ICU factions were ideologically moderate, a small vein did practice 
more militant extremism.
85
  Although this extremist network can trace 
its roots back to 2003, it did not emerge as an essential component of 
the ICU until 2006.”
86
 
Despite the ICU’s predominantly moderate tendencies, America 
imputed the violence of the extremist minoritiy to the organization as a 
whole. This in turn perpetuated America’s belief that Somali Islamists 
were intrinsically connected to Al-Qaeda .
87
 As a result, America esca-
lated its operations in Somalia by launching the Alliance for Restoration 
of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) in 2006.
88
 The ARPCT was 
another “dirty war” operation where American-funded warlords were 
tasked with abducting suspected terrorists and curtailing Islamist influ-
ence in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
89
 The ICU responded to this 
domestic aggression with escalated force, and after several months of 
intense fighting, the ICU gained total control of Mogadishu, which so-
lidified their authority in Somalia.
90
 
Further exacerbating the situation, in July 2006, Osama Bin Laden 
 
 82. Id. at 8-9. 
 83. Isaac Kfir, Islamic Radicalism in East Africa: Is There a Cause for Concern?, 31 
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 829, 842 (2008), available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100802291584#.Uq_vu2RDvN. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 9. 
 86. Holzer, supra note 15, at 33. 
 87. Id.; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 10. 
 88. Holzer, supra note 15, at 34. 
 89. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 8. 
 90. BRONWYN E. BRUTON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOMALIA: A NEW 
APPROACH 7 (Special Report 52, Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/792737380?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org
%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FSomalia_CSR52.pdf%26checksum%3D58462
1b9306f8aa15d495cc5eacb2eac&title=&linktype=digitalObject&detail. 
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issued a message encouraging the ICU takeover and vocally threatening 
backlash should any international intervention occur.
91
 While unsolicit-
ed by the ICU, Bin Laden’s statement only worsened America’s percep-
tion of Somali Islamists by bolstering the organization’s perceived rela-
tionship with Al-Qaeda.
92
  Rhetoric comparing the ICU to the Taliban 
was common during 2006 despite the fact that Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed, the leader of the ICU at this time, was widely regarded as a 
“moderate.”
93
 America’s miscalculation of Al-Qaeda’s relationship with 
the ICU is embodied in the official statement of Jendayi Frazer, the as-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during this time, in which 
she declared that the ICU is now “controlled by al-Qaeda cell individu-
als. The top layer of the Court are extremists. They are terrorists.”
94
 This 
statement possessed only a kernel of truth. While some Islamists with 
extremist tendencies transitioned from the AIAI to the ICU and ulti-
mately to Al-Shabaab, these individuals represent the exception, not the 
rule.
95
 Since the base majority of Somali Islamists held moderate be-
liefs, labeling Somali Islamists as terrorists and analogizing the ICU to 
the Taliban served only to strengthen the extremist minority and further 
elevate tension.
96
 To make matters worse, Ethiopia and the recently 
ousted Transitional Federal Government (TFG), also perceived the 
growing strength of the ICU as a serious threat, causing the TFG to 
happily follow the United States’ lead in adopting rhetoric artificially 
linking Somali Islamists to Al-Qaeda.
97
 
In December of 2006, Ethiopia launched an American-supported 
invasion that wrestled away control of Mogadishu from the ICU.
98
 Ul-
timately, the ICU’s military capacity lacked endurance and the Ethiopi-
 
 91. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 10. 
 92. Id. at 10-11. 
 93. Id. at 1, 10, 25. See Kfir, supra note 83, at 842 (for an example of Taliban ICU compari-
son).  
 94. Gwynne Dyer, Somalia: Back to Perpetual War, GWYNNE DYER (Mar. 10, 2007), 
http://gwynnedyer.com/tag/uic/. 
 95. See Watts et al., supra note 21, at 113, 131. 
 96. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 25. 
 97. This was demonstrated in a formal 2006 letter to the Monitoring Group on Somalia in 
which Ethiopian officials emphatically asserted that “[t]he Horn of Africa region is currently the 
target of active destabilization by dangerous international terrorist groups.” See Letter from 
Dawit Yohannes, Ambassador of Ethiopia, to Monitoring Group on Somalia (Oct. 9, 2006), re-
printed in U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, Nov. 22, 2006, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/913, Annex X, available at 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/S2006913.pdf. 
 98. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 20, 25. 
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an occupation successfully forced the ICU’s descent from prominence.
99
 
4. Rise of Al-Shabaab 
Although the ICU was only in power for one year, the organiza-
tions meteoric rise and decline had a radicalizing effect that generated 
nationalist sentiment among many Somalis and established credibility 
for the Islamist movement.
100
 This in turn opened the door for jihadist 
extremist factions to emerge from the remnants of the ICU, the most 
prominent of which would become known as the youth movement—Al-
Shabaab.
101
 As the ICU declined, Al-Shabaab jihadists remained resili-
ent and employed unconventional warfare and terrorist tactics against 
Ethiopian and TFG targets.
102
 In addition, the residual public support for 
the ICU was shifted to Al-Shabaab and as outrage toward the Ethiopian 
occupation grew, so too did Al-Shabaab’s level of public support.
103
 
Since 2006, Al-Shabaab has emerged as the predominant Somali 
Islamist organization.
104
 In 2008, America officially declared Al-
Shabaab to be a terrorist organization and began conducting military 
operations.
105
 Despite Al-Shabaab’s continued increase in power and in-
fluence, it is important to note that the organization does not enjoy uni-
versal favor among the Somali people.
106
 While some Somalis credit Al-
Shabaab with improved regional security and stability, many actually 
criticize Al-Shabaab’s ruthless recruitment tactics, punishments, and 
over-zealous religious mandates.
107
 
While instances of Al-Shabaab’s violence have remained mostly 
localized in the Horn of Africa, the nature of their aggressive tactics 
may indicate that the organization is transitioning into an expansive in-
ternational threat.
108
 The most concerning of these tactics has been Al-
 
 99. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1. 
 100. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 9-11. 
 101. Id. at 12, 17-18; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36. 
 102. Masters, supra note 20. 
 103. Id.; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, supra note 32. 
 104. Masters, supra note 20. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 38. 
 107. Id.; Mohamed Mohamed, Somali Justice – Islamist Style, BBC (May 20, 2009, 8:55 
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8057179.stm. For example, Al-Shabaab’s requirement that 
women wear the traditional hijab and be fully covered at all times in public is greatly disfavored; 
these practices are foreign to Somali culture and counterproductive in the agrarian economy of 
rural Somalia.  
 108. See Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 386 (specifically, in De-
cember 2010 an Al-Shabaab official stated that the group “would attack the U.S. if President 
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Shabaab’s effective use of the Internet and social media websites, such 
as Twitter, to recruit foreigners into their ranks.
109
 Americans comprise 
a substantial portion of foreign enlistments; it is estimated that from 
2007 to 2010, Al-Shabaab had recruited more than forty Americans 
from Somali communities in Phoenix and Minneapolis to join their 
cause.
110
 Not only is this a novel method to spread jihadist propaganda, 
but it also presents a dangerous means of infiltration that could poten-
tially produce catastrophic results. This threat of catastrophe nearly 
manifested itself in 2009 when the Australian government thwarted an 
attack on the Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney meant to be execut-
ed by Australian Somalis connected to Al-Shabaab.
111
 
Although Al-Shabaab is a prominent international terrorist organi-
zation, the extent of Al-Shabbab’s connection with Al-Qaeda remains 
unclear.
112
 Although Al-Shabaab’s former leader, Mukhtar Abu al-
Zubair, vocally pledged  allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, there is no in-
dication that Al-Shabaab has wavered from its primary goal of “[turn-
ing] Somalia into a Shabab-ville where strict Islamic law rules every-
thing,”
113
 Nonetheless, the future plans of Al-Shabaab remain unknown 
and only time will tell whether this terrorist organization will continue 
focusing its efforts within the Horn of Africa or if it is poised to act in-
ternationally. 
III. AL-SHABBAB TODAY 
The landscape of international Islamist terrorism is presently in 
flux. In the 2011 Report on Terrorism, the State Department concluded 
that the loss of Osama Bin Laden and the death of other prominent lead-
ership has forced Al-Qaeda “on a path of decline that will be difficult to 
 
Obama refuses to embrace Islam.”). 
 109. Seth G. Jones, The Terrorist Threat From Al Shabaab, RAND CORP. 5 (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT400/RAND_CT400.pdf. 
 110. Id. at 3. 
 111. The enemy within: al-Shabab in Australia, AUSTRALIAN NEWS COMMENT, 
http://australian-news.net/articles/view.php?id=148 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014); see also Al-
Shabaab’s American Recruits, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 2 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american-recruits.pdf. 
 112. Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab, supra note 38.  
 113. Id.; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 38; CNN Wire 
Staff, Al-Shabaab Joining Al-Qaeda, monitor group says, CNN WORLD (Feb. 10, 2010, 1:07 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/. (Mukhtar Abu al-
Zubair stated: “[o]n behalf of the soldiers and the commanders in al-Shabaab, we pledge alle-
giance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom that was drawn by our imam, the 
martyr Osama.”)  
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reverse.”
114
 In direct contrast, that same report focused in depth on the 
emergence of Al-Shabaab and described Al-Shabaab as possessing the 
“willingness and ability to conduct attacks outside of Somalia.”
115
 
While it is unclear whether Al-Qaeda truly is in decline,
116
 the em-
phasis this report placed on Al-Shabaab is indicative of America’s 
growing apprehension towards the rapid development of this young, yet 
increasingly aggressive, terrorist organization.
117
 This concern has 
gained momentum and was especially relevant following Al-Shabaab’s 
attack on a Nairobi mall that resulted in at least sixty-seven deaths on 
September 21, 2013.
118
 Further complicating matters was the revelation 
that several Americans who joined Al-Shabaab participated in the at-
tack.
119
 
America’s response to this act of terror was both immediate and 
forceful. On October 5, 2013, American Navy SEALs conducted a raid 
on an Al-Shabaab compound in a failed attempt to capture a senior offi-
cial in the group.
120
 On October 29, 2013, an American drone strike 
killed two Al-Shabaab officials, including a top explosives expert.
121
 It 
is important to note that these examples are not isolated instances of 
forceful incursion. America has been openly conducting military opera-
tions against Al-Shabaab long before the organization gained the level 
of international notoriety it presently holds.
122
 
 
 114. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See generally Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible De-
cline or Imminent Victory?, RAND CORP. (2012), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Kenya mall attack terrorists included “two or three” Americans, Kenyan foreign minis-
ter Amina Mohamed says, CBS NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:18 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kenya-mall-attack-terrorists-included-two-or-three-americans-
kenyan-foreign-minister-amina-mohamed-says/ [hereinafter Kenya mall attack included Ameri-
cans]. 
 119. Id.; Lisa Millar, Fears Al Shabaab a significant global terror threat, ABC NEWS (Sept. 
23, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-23/fears-al-shabaab-a-significant-
global-terror-threat/4974224; see also Al-Shabaab’s American Recruits, supra note 111, at 2-5. 
 120. Abdalle Ahmed, Spencer Ackerman & David Smith, How the US raid on al-Shabaab in 
Somalia went wrong, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-raid-al-shabaab-somalia-navy-seals.  
 121. David Smith, US drone strike in Somalia kills top al-Shabaab explosives expert, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/us-drone-strike-
somalia-al-shabaab-expert. 
 122. Woods, supra note 10. 
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The sole fact that Al-Shabaab is suspected of committing acts of 
terror does not by itself validate American drone and military strikes 
under domestic law. Although an official legal rationale for these strikes 
has never been promulgated, it has been strongly suggested that Ameri-
can officials believe Al-Shabaab falls within the authority granted by 
Congress in the 2001 AUMF.
123
 This section will evaluate the validity 
of this belief by testing the applicability of the AUMF as well as the le-
gally precarious Associated Forces expansion to Al-Shabaab. This dis-
cussion will comprehensively analyze and demonstrate that Al-Shabaab 
does not fulfill the AUMF’s requirements. Therefore, authorizing mili-
tary force against Al-Shabaab under the Associated Forces interpreta-
tion not only produces inconsistent results, but also raises serious legal 
questions. The ultimate purpose of this analysis is not narrowly focused 
on the legality of American use of force against Al-Shabaab. Rather, Al-
Shabaab is merely a case study used to scrutinize the AUMF’s viability 
in confronting this new generation of terrorist organizations. 
Furthermore, none of this analysis is meant to imply that Al-
Shabaab is harmless. On the contrary, Al-Shabaab’s violent proclivities 
and proven ability to recruit American citizens into its ranks presents 
deeply troubling security concerns.
124
 Even this, however, is no excuse 
for extralegal military action, and for the sake of transparency and cred-
ibility, America should cease these military strikes or congressionally 
evolve the AUMF to encompass Al-Shabaab and other emerging terror-
ist threats. 
Part A will begin by providing a brief overview of the AUMF and 
how it has been applied during its lifetime. Part B will discuss the legis-
lative history and subsequent application of the AUMF as well as ex-
plore the development of the expansive Associated Forces interpreta-
tion. Part C will conclude with an analytical comparison of the AUMF’s 
application to Al-Qaeda versus the AUMF’s application to Al-Shabaab.  
The purpose of this comparison is to illustrate a stark contrast and ulti-
mately demonstrate that Al-Shabaab does not comfortably fall within 
any interpretation of the AUMF. 
 
 123. Bill Roggio, US justifies Somalia raid under AUMF, which Obama seeks to repeal, THE 
LONG WAR J. (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/us_justifies_somalia.php. 
 124. Jones, supra note 109, at 5.  
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1. The AUMF 
In response to Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the Pentagon and 
World Trade Center, the AUMF, which Congress passed into law on 
September 18, 2001, provides: 
“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropri-
ate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
125
 
While clearly authorizing military action against Al-Qaeda and 
those responsible for 9/11, the AUMF, which remains unchanged after 
twelve years of conflict, has outgrown its purpose and seemingly 
evolved into a catchall justification for drone strikes against any Islam-
ist organization with a proclivity towards terrorism.
126
 Al-Shabaab is 
one such organization, and the use of AUMF language in conjunction 
with American drone and military strikes in Somalia strongly suggests 
that American officials believe that Al-Shabaab falls under the 
AUMF.
127
 However, this broad application of the AUMF contradicts the 
express scope and language of the statute. On its face, the AUMF’s lim-
iting language and intentional use of the past tense narrowly construes 
authorization of force towards those persons, groups, or nations with 
some nexus to the 9/11 attacks.
128
 As will be demonstrated in the subse-
quent analysis, Al-Shabaab lacks the requisite 9/11 connection, there-
fore, asserting the AUMF as justification for military strikes against Al-
Shabaab is in clear violation of the statute’s plain language. 
This, however, is not the end of the analysis. During its extended 
life, the AUMF has found itself subject to gratuitous presidential inter-
pretation that has expanded authorization to also encompass Associated 
Forces.
129
 Regardless of the fact that this questionable expansion re-
 
 125. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 126. See Roggio, supra note 106; see also Maria Newman, Bin Laden Takes Responsibility 
for 9/11 Attacks in New Tape, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/29/international/30osamaCND.html?_r=0. 
 127. See id.  
 128. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE 
OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf; see also Interview with 
David Glazier, Int’l Law Professor, Loyola Law School, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 20, 2013) (discussing 
the importance of tense in the AUMF). 
 129. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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mains entirely absent from the original language of the AUMF, alleged 
terrorist organizations are ostensibly labeled as Associated Forces and 
somehow shoehorned into the parameters of the AUMF.
130
 
2. The History of the AUMF 
If the meaning of a statute is not clear from the plain language, 
meaning may also be derived from an analysis of the drafters’ intent, the 
statute’s subsequent interpretive application, and an examination of the 
statute’s legislative history.
131
 While the language of the AUMF does 
not appear to be ambiguous, an evaluation of these factors is helpful to 
establish context and discover any implied authorization that may exist. 
By design, no formal reports on the AUMF’s legislative process 
were produced.
132
 However, comparing the language differences in each 
draft, can provide clarity as to the meaning behind the words.
133
 The ini-
tial AUMF drafts proposed by the White House sought presidential au-
thorization “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or ag-
gression against the United States.”
134
 The lack of clear target and 
durational parameters in this language raised controversy.
135
 As Repre-
sentative DeFazio argued on the floor: “[t]he earlier drafts ceded too 
much authority to the executive branch.”
136
 The congressional majority 
agreed with this notion, and the overly broad language in these early 
White House drafts was ultimately rejected by Congress in the final 
draft, which instead authorized the President “to use all necessary and 
appropriate force” in pursuit of those responsible for 9/11.
137
 This revi-
sion makes it clear that Congress did not intend to provide broad and 
all-encompassing authorization for the President to confront all future 
terrorist threats with force.
138
 To the contrary, Congress clearly intended 
 
 130. Lauren Harper, Want to Know Who the US is at War With? Too Bad, Says Pentagon, 
NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/want-to-
know-who-the-us-is-at-war-with-too-bad-says-pentagon/ (discussing how the list of “Associated 
Forces” remains classified. According to the Department of Defense, revealing the list could 
cause “serious damage to Security.”).   
 131. For a description of Statutory Construction, see 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 113 (2014).  
 132. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 2-3. 
 136. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 n.134 (2005). 
 137. Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2010), 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
 138. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2. 
RAND_FINAL_FOR_PUB 9/17/2015  12:56 PM 
136 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 37:117 
 
to limit the AUMF to individuals, organizations, and nations that had 
some ascertainable connection to the 9/11 attacks.
139
 As Representative 
Udall summarily noted: “[the AUMF] is broad, but it is not unlimited. It 
covers the culpable but it is not aimed at anyone else. In other words, in 
voting for this resolution, I am voting not for vengeance but for jus-
tice.”
140
 
Congress’s clear limiting intent did not insulate the AUMF from 
gratuitous interpretation. On September 20, 2011, just two days after the 
AUMF was codified, President Bush proclaimed: “[o]ur enemy is a rad-
ical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our 
war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated.”
141
 This broad generalization of an “unbound war” against 
terrorism stands in stark contrast to the congressional intent encapsulat-
ed in the plain language of the AUMF.
142
 Indeed, President Bush’s 
statement seems to more readily coincide with the White House’s pro-
posed authorization—”to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism 
or aggression against the United States”—which was specifically reject-
ed by Congress in favor of more limiting language.
143
 
When evaluating whether President Bush’s broad characterization 
of the AUMF possibly passes judicial muster, we are guided by Justice 
Jackson’s famous, yet admittedly oversimplified, classifications of pres-
idential power from his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
144
 Justice Jackson’s concurrence provides that “the 
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpreta-
tion” attach “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress.”
145
 Some have argued that because Congress 
expressly authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001,”
146
 the President is awarded “the strong-
 
 139. Id. 
 140. 147 CONG. REC 120, H5671, para. 3 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-09-14/pdf/CREC-2001-09-14-pt1-PgH5638-4.pdf. 
 141. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2049.  
 142. Id. at 2049-52. 
 143. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2-3. 
 144. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). 
 145. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2050; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 
343 U.S. at 635, 637.  
 146. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a) 
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est presumption and the widest latitude” to make these arguably unre-
viewable determinations as he sees fit.
147
 This argument, however, fails 
to consider Jackson’s Category 3, which provides that “[w]hen the Pres-
ident takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”
148
 As clearly indicated in 
the AUMF’s drafting process and floor debates, Congress expressly in-
tended the AUMF to be constrained only to those “nations, organiza-
tions, or persons” with a nexus to the 9/11 attacks.
149
 Thus, construing 
this limited authorization expansively is “incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress” and therefore President Bush’s 
broad interpretation should be categorically rejected.
150
 
However, in the wake of 9/11, President Bush’s broad characteri-
zation of the AUMF was largely ignored because all the initial targets at 
that time clearly possessed the requisite 9/11 nexus and thus comforta-
bly fell within the express authorization granted by Congress. Neverthe-
less, the residual effects were profound and President Bush’s expansive 
interpretation of the AUMF, made only days after its enactment, set 
precedent for broad Presidential interpretation inconsistent with the in-
tended scope of the AUMF’s Congressional authorization. 
3. Development of the Associated Forces Expansion 
Application of the AUMF to the War on Terror quickly proved to 
be problematic.
151
 While the AUMF gave the President authorization to 
use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aid-
ed the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”
152
 actual 
application of the conventional wartime terminology to the amorphous 
and far from conventional War on Terror proved challenging. For ex-
ample, in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was so interwoven with the Taliban 
and general populace that it proved difficult to simply identify and de-
 
 147. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 140, at 2050, 2082. 
 148. Id. at 2050; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 149. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a). 
 150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 151. Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. (2005) (explaining that 
“The term ‘enemy combatant’ has historically referred to all of the citizens of a state with which 
the Nation is at war, and who are members of the armed force of that enemy state. Enemy com-
batants in the present conflict, however, come from many nations, wear no uniforms, and use un-
conventional weapons. Enemy combatants in the war on terrorism are not defined by simple, 
readily apparent criteria, such as citizenship or military uniform. And the power to name a citizen 
as an ‘enemy combatant’ is therefore extraordinarily broad.”) 
 152. Id.; S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a). 
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fine an individual’s capacity in the hostilities.
153
 
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, President Bush issued a 
military order on November 13, 2001. Section 2 of this order provided 
that detention authority extended to individuals if: 
“(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant 
times, 
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as [Al-Qaeda]; 
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts 
of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor[e], that have 
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or ad-
verse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign 
policy, or economy; or 
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in 
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and 
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be 
subject to this order.”
154
 
It is important to note that this order treated all detainees as “ene-
my combatants” subject to trial by military tribunals without application 
of the rules of evidence.
155
 
The parameters for detention authority set forth in section 2 of the 
order do not, in isolation, seem problematic. The language of the mili-
tary order was largely adopted from the AUMF and the acceptable de-
tainees under this order possess a nexus to Al-Qaeda.
156
 While this may 
be true, the budding expansion to the AUMF did not reside within the 
express language of the order, but rather in the addition of the category 
Associated Forces, which appeared in the definition of “enemy combat-
ant” on all the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) forms: 
An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was 
part of or supporting the Taliban or [Al-Qaeda] forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coa-
lition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent 
act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
157
 
 
 153. See Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, supra note 151. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.   
 156. Compare Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, supra note 151 (language) with S.J. Res. 
23. At this point Al-Qaeda was known to be the “nations, organizations, or persons [that] 
planned, authorized, [and] committed, the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.” 
See also Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror, 22 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 377, 378 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 157. Combatant Status Review Board, Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review 
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As will be discussed below, the inclusion of Associated Forces to 
the “enemy combatant” umbrella expanded the parameters of the War 
on Terror beyond what the AUMF originally authorized. Nevertheless, 
the Associated Forces terminology received legislative support and was 
incorporated by Congress in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and 
later again in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
158
 
In the 2009 case Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
addition of Associated Forces with respect to the governments’ deten-
tion authority over alleged enemy combatants.
159
 In its holding, the court 
provided that such authority extended to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
their “Associated Forces.”
160
 The court defined Associated Forces as 
“co-belligerents” operating in conjunction with the goals of Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban.
161
 In effect, the addition of Associated Forces in the 
Hamlily holding supported the assertion that America’s detention au-
thority was not wholly constrained by the AUMF’s express limita-
tions.
162
 
When President Obama took office in 2009, he vocally rejected the 
War on Terror and its attendant terminology popularized by the prior 
administration.
163
 However, this rejection later proved to be hollow as 
AUMF authorization has further expanded under his administration’s 
watch.
164
 Of particular note, President Obama’s administration has em-
braced the Associated Forces terminology, which was previously only 
applied in detention authority cases, and shoehorned the label into the 
umbrella of AUMF targets against which America is authorized to use 
lethal force.
165
 
This expansion was clearly demonstrated in the Department of Jus-
tice’s White Paper, which was allegedly leaked to the press on February 
 
Tribunal, U.S DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 7, 2004), 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/detainees.pdf (emphasis added). 
 158. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf; see also National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298 
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf. 
 159. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 70. 
 162. Id.; see also Combatant Status Review Board, supra note 157.  
 163. Daniel Halper, Obama Rejects ‘Global War on Terror,’ THE WEEKLY STANDARD, (May 
23, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-rejects-global-war-
terror_728944.html. 
 164. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 165. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378, 393-95. 
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4, 2013 in response to the controversy surrounding the killing of Anwar 
Al-Awlaki, and American citizen.
166
 The White Paper outlined the legal-
ity of American international use of force and conspicuously included 
Associated Forces in conjunction with the AUMF authorization lan-
guage: “[t]he President has authority to respond to the imminent threat 
posed by [Al-Qaeda] and its Associated Forces . . . [with] Congress’s 
authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force 
against this enemy.”
167
 President Obama corroborated this expansion of 
Associated Forces in a speech given to the National Defense University 
on May 23, 2013: “America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/
11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of 
force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at 
war with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.”
168
 Further-
more, in a speech given on November 30, 2012, Jeh Johnson, General 
Council for the Department of Defense from 2009 to 2012, stated: 
“[t]he United States government is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda 
and associated forces, to which the laws of armed conflict apply.”
169
 
How Associated Forces became acceptable targets in America’s 
War on Terror is puzzling and there has been surprisingly little discus-
sion about how this expansion is legally permissible.
170
 Nonetheless, the 
prior examples clearly indicate that the Associated Forces label has 
been constructively imputed into the framework of the AUMF despite 
the fact that this expansion contradicts the statute’s intended scope of 
authorization.
171
 
 
 166. Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on Amer-
icans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:57 PM), 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-
reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans 
(explaining that Anwar Al-Awlaki was an American citizen that allegedly joined the Al-Qaeda 
branch in Yemin and was killed by a drone strike).  
 167. Department of Justice, White Paper: Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against 
a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, 
MSNBC, available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2014) (emphasis added).  
 168. Obama’s Remarks, supra note 1. 
 169. Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Speech at Oxford Union (Feb. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-
union/#_ftn11 (emphasis added). 
 170. Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 123. 
 171. Additionally, if the United States purports to abide by international law, then Associated 
Forces that have not engaged in hostilities against the United States are not legally permissible 
targets. While the details of international law fall outside the scope of this discussion, it is worth 
noting that the AUMF is essentially domestic legal recognition that America is involved in an 
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4. Analysis: Is Al-Shabaab an Authorized Adversary Under the AUMF? 
After considering the plain language of the AUMF, its legislative 
history, and its recent application, it is appropriate to determine whether 
Al-Shabaab is subsumed under AUMF authorization. In answering this 
question, it is beneficial to first show the proper function of an AUMF 
application. Thus, each of the substantive elements in the AUMF will be 
delineated and briefly applied to clearly acceptable targets—Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban.
172
 Such an application will benefit later analysis by 
demonstrating an applicable standard under the plain language of the 
AUMF that will be subsequently compared to Al-Shabaab. 
The first element of the AUMF states, “[t]hat the President is au-
thorized to use all necessary and appropriate force.”
173
 As a preliminary 
matter, this language presumably encompasses drone and Special Forc-
es strikes because these attacks have proven to be a highly successful 
and efficient means of combating terrorist organizations.
174
 Additional-
ly, common sense indicates that surgical military strikes result in less 
cumulative loss of life than utilizing American soldiers in traditional 
combat roles. Indeed, if these surgical strikes do not constitute “neces-
sary and appropriate force,” then this AUMF element is effectively ren-
dered useless. Of course, these strikes are not without controversy. 
Drone strikes in particular present substantial legal and ethical con-
cern.
175
 However, these concerns fall outside the scope of this analysis 
and America’s military strikes will be presumed “necessary and appro-
priate” when applied to Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.
176
 
The second element authorizes force against “those nations, organ-
izations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”
177
 This element, here-
inafter the Authorized Adversary element, clearly encompasses—if not 
 
armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, a group that engaged in sufficiently intense hostilities to justify the 
existence of an armed conflict under article 51 of the UN charter. However, associated forces that 
have never engaged in hostilities against the United States, such as Al-Shabaab, cannot be con-
sidered part of this armed conflict, and they cannot be included simply out of convenience. See 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2067-70, 2089-91. 
 172. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378. 
 173. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 174. McDonnell, supra note 9, at 249, 279.  
 175. See generally McDonnell, supra note 9. 
 176. Id. at 264; see also S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a), § 2(a). 
 177. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a). 
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expressly targets—both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
178
 Al-Qaeda repre-
sents the organization that both planned and committed the 9/11 attacks 
while the Taliban in Afghanistan represents the government that har-
bored Al-Qaeda both before and after the attack.
179
 
The final AUMF element establishes the purpose of the AUMF: 
“in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
180
 According 
to this Purpose element, for a target to fall within the AUMF’s umbrel-
la, it must pose a future threat of terrorism to the United States.
181
 Al-
Qaeda cleanly fulfills this requirement because the organization openly 
promotes a jihadist anti-American ideology and has demonstrated its 
ability to commit acts of terror against the United States. 
The Purpose element, however, may additionally serve as a tem-
poral limit that logically expires when the terrorist organization at issue 
no longer poses a threat of “international terrorism” against the United 
States.
182
 As indicated in America’s 2011 Country Report on Terrorism, 
many believed that the death of Osama Bin Laden coupled with Ameri-
ca’s constant military pressure forced Al-Qaeda on a “path of decline 
that will be difficult to reverse.”
183
 Consequently, it can be argued that 
the degradation of Al-Qaeda’s power in recent years has crippled the 
organization beyond effective operational capacity and thus the 
AUMF’s self-contained “sunset provision” should be invoked.
184
 
As Al-Qaeda was the primary culprit responsible for the 9/11 at-
tacks and thus the focus of the American military response. Thus, it is to 
be expected that the organization, at least for a time, comfortably satis-
 
 178. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378. 
 179. See generally Newman, supra note 126; K. ALAN KRONSTADT & KENNETH KATZMAN, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER 
REGION AND U.S. POLICY (R.L. 34763) (Nov. 21, 2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf (summary); see also Barack Obama, 
President of the United States, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way 
Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-
afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
 180. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a). 
 181. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 140, at 2072, 2111 (the methodology of fragmenting the 
AUMF into elements was adopted from this source). 
 182. Interview with David Glazier, supra note 128. 
 183. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5. 
 184. This is an argument to fully explore in another discussion, but it is worth mentioning 
here because the inclusion of this “sunset provision” in the AUMF lends additional support to the 
notion that Congress did not intend the AUMF to authorize a broad and unbound war on terror. 
For a discussion on this subject, see Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 18-19.  
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fied the AUMF’s three elements.
185
 Application of these elements to 
present day Islamist organizations, however, is not so clear. As the nex-
us between 9/11 and present day terrorist organizations has diminished, 
so too have the acceptable targets become less obvious.
186
 The terrorist 
organization Al-Shabaab represents a prime example of this dilemma, 
and when one attempts to shoehorn Al-Shabaab into AUMF authoriza-
tion, it becomes immediately apparent that such an application is prob-
lematic. 
The first major issue generated by this application arises from the 
Authorized Adversary language in the second element of the AUMF. 
Congress specified a very narrow demographic by using past tense in 
the statute’s plain language to authorize the use of force against “those 
nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”
187
 This 
demographic does not include Al-Shabaab, quite simply, because Al-
Shabaab did not exist on September 11, 2001.
188
 As demonstrated in 
Section II of this article, Al-Shabaab emerged from the remnants of the 
ICU in 2006—five years after the 9/11 attacks.
189
 Thus Al-Shabaab, as 
an independent entity, could neither have assisted Al-Qaeda nor partici-
pated in the attacks in any meaningful way. For this single reason it 
could be strongly argued that Al-Shabaab fails to satisfy the Authorized 
Adversary element of the AUMF. 
This conclusion, however, is predicated on a literal reading of the 
Authorized Adversary element. A creative advocate of broad AUMF in-
terpretation may attempt to exploit Al-Shabaab’s history by arguing that 
authorization can be derived from previous Somali Islamist organiza-
tions.
190
 This theory would contend that because Al-Shabaab’s roots are 
interconnected with prior Somali Islamist organizations, and some ex-
tremist members of Al-Shabaab were also once members of the ICU 
and the AIAI, any connection drawn between these preceding Islamist 
organizations and pre-9/11 Al-Qaeda should be imputed to Al-
 
 185. Newman, supra note 126. 
 186. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378.  
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87, 98-102. 
 190. For a similar argument, see James Phillips, Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the 
War on Terrorism, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 7 (Apr. 5, 2002), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/04/somalia-and-al-qaeda-implications-for-the-war-
on-terrorism. 
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Shabaab.
191
 Theoretically, this argument is plausible because such indi-
viduals do exist, albeit in very small numbers,
192
 and it is well estab-
lished that Al-Qaeda agents were in contact with Somali Islamists dur-
ing the 1990’s in an effort to expand their operations into the Horn of 
Africa.
193
 
This argument falls short for several reasons. First, Somali Islam-
ists during the 1990’s had no known connection to 9/11, and although 
there were suspicions that financing for the attacks was wired through 
the Somali Al-Barakaat bank, these suspicions were ultimately proven 
to be incorrect.
194
 Furthermore, as was discussed above, Al-Qaeda’s op-
erations in Somalia during this period were unsuccessful.
195
 Numerous 
factors were responsible for this failure, but it was mostly Al-Qaeda’s 
inability to overcome distrust while traversing the logistical challenges 
inherent in Somalia’s clan-based identity and poor infrastructure that 
was responsible for the failure.
196
 Finally, while it is true that Al-Qaeda 
agents resided in Somalia for the purpose of establishing training 
camps, it would be a gross overstatement to argue that Somali Islamists 
“harbored” Al-Qaeda terrorists.
197
  In fact, immediately following 9/11, 
Somali Islamists closed the Al-Qaeda training camps for fear of Ameri-
can military reprisal, and Al-Qaeda agents in the region were forced to 
flee or go into hiding.
198
 Even if one determines that Somali Islamists 
were technically “harboring” Al-Qaeda agents at the time of 9/11, the 
Al-Qaeda agents operating in Somalia had no known connection to the 
9/11 attacks, and by all accounts, Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Somali 
Islamists was purely superficial and lacked ideological harmony.
199
 In 
addition, it is apparent from the Harmony Documents that Al-Qaeda’s 
decision to commence operations in Somalia was unsolicited.
200
 There is 
no indication that Somali Islamists invited or offered a safe haven to Al-
Qaeda operatives,
201
 thus, asserting the AUMF’s “harboring” language 
over Al-Shabaab merely because Al-Qaeda operatives were in contact 
with Somali Islamists prior to 9/11 seems untenable and does not reso-
 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 49-77.  
 192. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4, 6. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 19.  
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50. 
 196. See supra Section II.B. 
 197. See supra Section II.A.  
 198. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 7. 
 199. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 6.  
 200. Id. at 4-6. 
 201. Id. at 5-6. 
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nate with the established congressional intention.
202
 
In summation, Al-Shabaab as an independent organization has no 
connection to 9/11, and any affiliation with Al-Qaeda that may be im-
puted from the AIAI or the ICU is so tenuous that to claim it falls within 
the scope of AUMF authorization would be disingenuous. Consequent-
ly, it is clear that AUMF authorization cannot be asserted over Al-
Shabaab based on the Authorized Adversary element. 
Applying AUMF authorization to Al-Shabaab under the third ele-
ment is just as problematic. Under the Purpose element, military action 
is authorized “in order to prevent any future acts of international terror-
ism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons” 
that satisfy the preceding Authorized Adversary element.
203
 Thus, the fi-
nal AUMF hoop requires that the targeted organization pose a continued 
terrorist threat to American security. 
Even if we disregard the prior analysis and instead conclude to the 
contrary that Al-Shabaab does qualify as an Authorized Adversary, 
American officials have still repeatedly taken the stance that Al-
Shabaab does not pose a threat to national security.
204
 Immediately fol-
lowing Al-Shabaab’s Nairobi mall attack on September 21, 2013, At-
torney General Eric Holder asserted that there was no “specific, credible 
evidence” that Al-Shabaab was planning a terrorist attack on American 
soil.
205
 In addition, the associate director of the International Security 
and Defense Policy Center at RAND Corporation offered testimony be-
fore the Committee of Foreign Affairs on October 13, 2013 asserting 
that “Al-Shabaab does not appear to be plotting attacks against the U.S. 
homeland.”
206
 Although these statements suggest that American officials 
 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40. 
 203. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 204. Even if these statements are not reflective of America’s true belief about the threat Al-
Shabaab presents to America, the result will probably be the same. The Purpose element of the 
AUMF is not operative in isolation and depends on the other two elements being satisfied. Pierre 
Thomas, Holder Questions Al Shabab’s Ability to Strike Inside US Homeland, ABC NEWS (Sept. 
26, 2013) http://abcnews.go.com/US/holder-questions-al-shababs-ability-strike-inside-
us/story?id=20388547. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Jones, supra note 109, at 2. It is worth noting that both of these statements focus on 
Homeland Security and fail to indicate whether Al-Shabaab poses a threat to American security 
abroad. Indeed, the RAND testimony expressly indicates that Al-Shaabaab may pose such a 
threat; “as the Westgate Mall attack shows, Al-Shabaab has the capability to conduct high-profile 
attacks in the region. The United States should be on high alert in East Africa.” Id. While the 
AUMF may be read broadly enough to encompass embassies and other international American 
institutions, this discussion functions under the assumption that the Purpose element is read only 
to encompass attacks within the United States. The foundation for this assumption seems to stem 
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are unsettled about Al-Shabaab’s recent agression, it is clear that gov-
ernment officials do not currently believe Al-Shabaab poses a credible 
threat within America’s borders.
207
 Consequently, it must be concluded 
that because America does not believe Al-Shabaab threatens “future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States,” Al-Shabaab 
does not satisfy the Purpose element of the AUMF.
208
 
From this analysis, it is clear that Al-Shabaab does not fulfill the 
requirements for either the Authorized Adversary element or the Pur-
pose element. Therefore, it does not fall within the scope of AUMF au-
thorization. This is not surprising since Congress intended the language 
in the original AUMF to be narrowly construed and authorization was 
meant to apply only to those organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, pos-
sessing a nexus to the 9/11 attacks.
209
 Al-Shabaab’s clear failure to satis-
fy the AUMF’s requirements lends strong support to the conclusion that 
American military strikes against this organization are extralegal. 
Before the legal permissibility of military strikes against Al-
Shabaab can be conclusively dismissed, however, it is necessary to 
determine if Al-Shabaab can qualify under the dubious Associated 
Forces label.
210
 As will be demonstrated below, the definition of an As-
sociated Force promulgated by the current administration is so ambigu-
ous and all-encompassing that it essentially renders the AUMF’s limita-
tions moot. 
According to the D.C. Circuit in Hamlily, an Associated Force, for 
the purpose of detention authority, is a “co-belligerent . . . fighting in 
association with one or more belligerent powers.”
211
 While this defini-
tion is unhelpfully vague, the court provides some clarity in note 17: 
“‘Associated Forces’ does not include terrorist organizations who mere-
ly share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al 
Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with 
Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.”
212
 
Note 17 in Hamiliy provides clear guidance regarding the proper 
application of the Associated Forces label. This guidance has been 
seemingly dismissed by the Obama Administration, which has not only 
applied the Associated Forces label beyond the authority to detain, but 
 
from the provided evidence that Congress intended the AUMF to be read narrowly.   
 207. Id.; see also Jones, note 109, at 2. 
 208. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 209. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 113640, at 2109. 
 210. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 211. Id. at 75. 
 212. Id. at 75 n.17 
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has also inexplicably redefined the term. Accordingly, an Associated 
Force now “[has] two characteristics: (1) [it is] an organized, armed 
group that has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda, and (2) [it] is a co-
belligerent with Al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners.”
213
 A cursory comparison of the Hamlily and Obama 
Administration’s definitions reveal that there is no universal under-
standing of what does and does not comprise an Associated Forces. As 
one scholar aptly puts it: “what exactly does it mean to be an ‘associated 
force?’ Are associated forces more closely tied to Al-Qaeda than its ‘al-
lies’ or is this a lower standard? Is there a threshold level of support be-
yond which we call it ‘substantial?’”
214
 All of these are excellent ques-
tions that, if answered, would provide much needed clarity. It does 
appear, however, that the American government has decided not to 
broach this subject.
215
 
The Obama Administration’s apparent willingness to not only ex-
pand application of the Associated Forces label to the use of lethal 
force, but also to fabricate a completely different standard for the term, 
has generated legitimate concern that the Associated Forces label is be-
ing used to circumvent the AUMF and justify military and drone strikes 
against “extra-AUMF” targets.
216
 Al-Shabaab represents a group that il-
lustrates this concern and the subsequent analysis will evaluate whether 
Al-Shabaab can be considered an Associated Force. 
In accordance with the Obama Administration’s first requirement, 
no one disputes that Al-Shabaab is both armed and organized. However, 
whether or not Al-Shabaab “has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda” 
is questionable.
217
 On the one hand, it is established that Al-Shabaab and 
preceding Somali Islamist organizations prior to 9/11 did utilize Al-
Qaeda’s military and pecuniary assistance to facilitate their own mili-
tary operations.
218
 In addition, Al-Shabaab vocally supported Al-Qaeda 
in 2012 when Al-Shabaab’s leader, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair, stated, 
“[o]n behalf of the soldiers and the commanders in Al-Shabaab, we 
pledge allegiance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom 
that was drawn by our imam, the martyr Osama.”
219
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Words, however, are not actions. To date, Al-Shabaab has never 
committed a terrorist attack reflecting Al-Qaeda’s western-focused Ji-
had, nor has it assumed an operationally subservient position to Al-
Qaeda command.
220
 In fact, Al-Shabaab, like all prior Somali Islamist 
organizations, has remained autonomous and mostly fixated on reclaim-
ing territory from Ethiopia, destabilizing the Western constructed TFG, 
and establishing Sharia rule.
221
 In addition, Hamlily’s clarification that 
Associated Forces must share a connection greater than a mere abstract 
philosophy or common purpose with Al-Qaeda supports the argument 
that words alone are insufficient.
222
 As a result, the evidence supporting 
a conclusion that Al-Shabaab “has entered the fight alongside [Al-] 
Qaeda” is not wholly dispositive.
223
 
The second requirement mandates that the terrorist organization be 
“a co-belligerent with [Al-]Qaeda in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners.”
224
 As previously discussed, there is no “specif-
ic, credible evidence” that Al-Shabaab poses a threat within American 
borders.
225
 However, the inclusion of “coalition partners” seemingly 
represents a vast expansion of the AUMF’s Purpose element. Under this 
expansion, not only would drone and military strikes no longer serve the 
purpose of only preventing “future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States,” but it would also serve to protect any one of 
the fifty nations participating in the post-9/11 coalition against terror-
ism.
226
  Because some of these “coalition partners” (namely Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Eritrea) have suffered the brunt of Al-Shabaab’s aggression, 
it must be conceded that Al-Shabaab most likely satisfies the second As-
sociated Forces requirement since the organization is engaged in hos-
tilities against its coalition partners. 
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While Al-Shabaab’s status as an Associated Force is debatable, it 
is readily apparent that the organization could feasibly qualify as an As-
sociated Force despite falling completely outside the scope of AUMF 
authorization. This apparent conflict is deeply concerning because the 
Associated Forces label sits on precarious legal footing and its existence 
blurs the AUMF’s clear parameters.
227
 
From a practical standpoint, the potential consequences of broad 
Associated Forces application are profound, and it seems impossible to 
reconcile the addition of “coalition partners” with the AUMF’s Purpose 
element. With the addition of Associated Forces, application of military 
force is no longer constrained to those groups that pose a future threat of 
terrorism only to the United States, and the scope of the conflict has ar-
guably expanded into a global war on terror.
228
 When considering this 
consequence, one cannot help but harken back to President Bush’s fore-
shadowing statement made only two days after the AUMF’s ratification: 
“[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It 
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated.”
229
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that drone and military 
strikes against Al-Shabaab are not authorized under the limiting lan-
guage of the AUMF, yet may nevertheless be permitted under the ex-
pansive Associated Forces interpretation. This apparent discrepancy is 
not localized to Al-Shabaab, but rather presents one example of the 
questionable analysis that flows from these often-conflicting justifica-
tions. Additionally problematic is the fact that the Associated Forces 
expansion does not rest on any clear legal footing, yet vastly expands 
the scope of the AUMF’s congressionally intended authorization. The 
AUMF clearly and intentionally limited the scope of authorization to 
those sharing a nexus to 9/11, while the Associated Forces expansion 
purports a broad and “unbound” war on terror. This discrepancy pro-
duces applications that are both puzzling and contradictory. 
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The apparent controversy between the AUMF and the Associated 
Forces label could have been resolved by section 1034 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for the 2012 Fiscal Year. If passed, section 
1034, Affirmation of Armed Conflict With Al-Qaeda, would have codi-
fied Associated Forces as a clear expansion to the AUMF and eliminat-
ed the “nebulous 9/11 requirement.”
230
 Curiously, the Obama Admin-
istration threatened to veto the bill, arguing that 1034 “would effectively 
recharacterize [the conflict’s] scope and . . . risk creating confusion re-
garding applicable standards.”
231
 In the face of this presidential pressure, 
1034 was removed from the final bill in favor of a restatement of Amer-
ica’s detention authority.
232
 
Why President Obama opposed legislation that would provide a 
clear legal foundation to corroborate the questionable contemporary ap-
plication of the Associated Forces label remains uncertain. Perhaps the 
reason was politically motivated, stemming from concern that the public 
eye would perceive 1034 as authorizing a permanent War on Terror. In-
deed, support for this theory can be derived from a recent speech Presi-
dent Obama gave before the National Defense University where he as-
serted his intention “to engage Congress about the existing 
Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we 
can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual 
wartime footing.”
233
 However, if the United States plans to continue 
adding to the patchwork of competing AUMF expansions in order to 
shoehorn additional terrorist organizations into the umbrella of authori-
zation, is America not artificially extending the life of its original inter-
national armed conflict with Al-Qaeda? So long as that international 
armed conflict endures, are we not “on a perpetual wartime footing?” 
As recent events have clearly articulated, the face of terrorism is in 
flux. Young terrorist organizations—organizations such as Al-Shabaab 
that possess little or no connection to 9/11—are emerging and employ-
ing new recruitment and terror tactics that resonate with the modern 
age. It is time for the American government to honestly reassess its dat-
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ed policy on terrorism because, with each passing year, application of 
the AUMF becomes more tenuous and the language fades further from 
relevance. Moreover, relying on the legally ambiguous Associated 
Forces expansion to pick up the slack where the AUMF falls short is a 
disingenuous solution not befitting our great Nation. Whether the Amer-
ican government decides to deactivate the AUMF and phase out the 
War on Terror, or pass new legislation that comfortably encompasses 
Al-Shabaab and other modern day terrorist threats, is a decision to be 
made through timely debate and the democratic process. Whatever the 
case, it is undeniable that after twelve years of hard-ridden mileage 
spanning two presidential administrations, the AUMF’s utility has run 
its course. 
 
